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GROUND-LEVEL IMPACTS OF REMOTE 
EMPLOYMENT POLICY: SOCIAL 
DISADVANTAGE UNDER THE COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
Zoe Staines 
Indigenous Australians continue to experience significant socio-
economic disadvantage across the life course (PMC 2018a; Productivity 
Commission 2016). This includes comparatively low labour-force 
participation and employment rates, especially in remote communities. 
Un- and under-employment can serve to further compound disadvantage 
by reducing household income, which has negative flow-on effects for 
access to basic needs like food, education and healthcare. Successive 
Australian governments have responded by delivering community 
development and employment programmes, the most recent of which is 
now in its third year of operation.  
The Community Development Programme (CDP) was introduced in 
2015. Since then, literature regarding the programme’s efficacy and 
impacts has continued to grow. However, most of the extant research 
presents high-level policy discussions concerning programme design 
(e.g. Staines 2018), or draws on high-level administrative data (e.g. 
Fowkes 2016a). Others draw in the experiences of particular Indigenous 
communities (Altman 2016; Jordan 2016), service providers (Fowkes 
2016b), and partial accounts of individual participants’ experiences with 
the programme (Kral 2016; Paterson 2016). Nevertheless, there are none 
in the existing academic literature that focus specifically on the ground-
level experiences of CDP participants through case-study research. 
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However, it is critical to understand participants’ experiences under CDP 
in order to inform future policy and programme design.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by drawing on 24 case 
studies of CDP participants from two remote regions: the first in Far 
North Queensland (FNQ); and the second in the Top End of the Northern 
Territory (NT). CDP participants in these regions are overwhelmingly 
Indigenous. Collectively, the cases illuminate how individals in different 
circumstances are affected by CDP and demonstrate the various 
implications of the current policy approach. In turn, they provide further 
empirical grounding for some of the assessments in the existing 
literature, and also provide useful lessons that could inform future policy 
development. These lessons are timely, given the Australian 
Government’s plans to reform CDP in early 2019. Ultimately, the paper 
argues that CDP is, in many ways, ill-equipped to deliver the outcomes it 
sets out to and that policies in this area need to be fundamentally 
reformed if outcomes are to improve.  
Indigenous employment in remote Australia 
Successive government programmes have been introduced across remote 
Australia to improve labour-force participation and employment 
outcomes for (predominantly) Indigenous Australians. These have 
included the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP) 
(1977–2015),1 the Job Network (JN) (1998–2009), Job Services Australia 
(JSA) (2009–2013),2 and the Remote Jobs and Communities Program 
(RJCP) (2013–2015). CDP was introduced in 2015 as a replacement for 
the RJCP.3  
The number of Indigenous Australians serviced by these remote 
programmes is typically reported as being somewhere between 26,000 
and 32,000 (ANAO 2017; DEEWR 2012; Fowkes and Sanders 2016; 
                                                 
1 CDEP began to be gradually phased out from 2007 onwards, though it was not 
completely removed until 2015.  
2 JSA was replaced by RJCP in remote areas in 2013, though it continued in urban areas 
until 2015.   
3 CDP was technically a variation to the existing RJCP contract, but the variation was so 
fundamental that it is reasonable to describe it as a new programme. 
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PMC 2017a). At September 2017, 33,000 people were reportedly 
participating in CDP, of whom more than 80% identified as Indigenous 
(around 26,400 individuals) (ANAO 2017; PMC 2017a).  
Despite these programmes, employment rates have worsened over recent 
years. Employment rates for Indigenous Australians in remote areas fell 
between the last two Censuses (2011 and 2016), by 4% for women and 
9% for men (see Venn and Biddle in this special issue). The gap between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous employment in remote areas also 
widened considerably (Venn and Biddle this issue). Over a longer 
timeframe, from 2006 to 2016, the overall Australian Indigenous 
employment rate fell from 48% to 46.6% (PMC 2018a).    
This is, at least in part, the result of the gradual removal of CDEP from 
2007–2015; CDEP participants who were previously counted in Census 
data as being ‘employed’ are now counted as ‘unemployed.’ However, 
even when data on CDEP participants are excluded from the 2006 and 
2011 Censuses (as per the process undertaken by Gray et al. 2013) 
employment is still only improving at a very slow rate. It will take 
decades to ‘close the gap’ particularly in remote Australia (Staines 2018).    
Remote employment programmes are only one influence on these data; 
there are also others. For example, the size of the Indigenous working-
age population in remote areas grew by approximately 6% between 
2011–16, thereby increasing demand for jobs in these areas (Venn and 
Biddle 2018). Broader economic policy and market shifts have likely 
also played a role. However, even outcomes measured through 
evaluations of programmes that have operated in remote areas are 
generally poor (e.g. DEEWR 2006, 2007, 2012; Productivity 
Commission 2002; Stromback 2008). There are also still many unknowns 
with regard to the specific impacts of these programmes on remote 
participants, because although evaluation work on CDEP did focus on 
remote areas (e.g. Altman et al. 2000), evaluations of JN and JSA did not 
(e.g. DEEWR 2012; Productivity Commission 2002).4 There have also 
been no evaluations of the remote-specific RJCP, and although an 
evaluation of CDP is ostensibly ongoing, no findings had been publicly 
released at the time of writing this article (SSCFPA 2017: 18).     
                                                 
4 DEEWR’s (2012) evaluation of JSA did focus explicitly on Indigenous participants, of 
which around one third lived remotely. However, it did not focus exclusively on remote 
areas.  
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Meanwhile, Indigenous individual and household incomes in remote 
areas have dropped. The median disposable household income in very 
remote areas dropped by $12 per week from 2011–2016 (Markham and 
Biddle 2018). The gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous incomes 
in remote communities has also widened (Markham and Biddle 2018; 
Staines 2017). This is particularly worrying, given it may serve to further 
compound the entrenched poverty already experienced by many remote-
living Indigenous Australians. Access to a regular and stable income is 
crucial in determining the wellbeing of individuals and their families. It 
helps put food on the table, enables access to healthcare and educational 
opportunities, and can contribute to mental health and wellbeing 
(Wycherley et al. 2017).       
The Community Development Programme 
CDP represents the latest programme to emerge from a decade of 
continual programme change. Although its underlying policy settings 
remain very similar to JN, JSA and RJCP (Staines 2018), it ushered in a 
new set of rules and regulations for participants and providers. CDP has a 
strong emphasis on Work for the Dole activities, with required 
participation increasing from around 15 hours per week to up to 25 hours 
per week, spread across five days. This directly affects around 53% of 
the CDP caseload who are undertaking Work for the Dole activities, 
while the remaining 47% are ‘basic service’ participants (ANAO 2017: 
17).5  
Where participants do not undertake required Work for the Dole 
activities, they may be subject to No Show No Pay (NSNP) penalties, 
meaning they lose one working day’s payment for each penalty applied 
(Australian Government 2018; Campbell et al. 2018: 16). Participants 
can also attract penalties for failing to fulfil other obligations, like 
attending appointments with their service provider. If a participant 
accumulates three NSNP penalties within six months, or refuses suitable 
work, they can be subject to a serious failure penalty, whereby their 
income support can be suspended for up to eight weeks (Fowkes 2016c). 
                                                 
5 Basic service participants are not required to participate in Work for the Dole activities 
because they are either not aged 18-49 years, or are not receiving activity-tested income 
support payments. 
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Where a serious penalty period is applied as a result of NSNP penalties, 
and the participant re-engages in activities, payments can be reinstated 
before the eight-week period has ended. However, as Fowkes (2016c) 
pointed out, missed payments are rarely back-paid.    
Other aspects that existed under RJCP, which enabled providers to 
deliver extra support to severely disadvantaged participants, were 
reduced under CDP. For example, there is less up-front funding for case 
management of participants’ diverse needs (as opposed to the 
Participation Account under RJCP, which could be used to cater to these 
needs), and the ‘streamed’ system to triage participants according to their 
level of need (as per the previous JN and JSA programmes) no longer 
exists. Although the funding framework was simplified under CDP, the 
administrative complexity is still high. Providers are eligible for service 
payments to deliver support to participants (up to $4,000 per participant 
annually) and Work for the Dole activities (up to $12,450 per participant 
annually) (ANAO 2017). They are also able to receive payments for 
employment outcomes – that is, where participants move into and stay in 
employment for 13 weeks and 26 or more weeks. To be eligible for the 
26-week outcome payment, participants must work consecutively for 26 
weeks (as opposed to RJCP, where they could work for 26 weeks over 52 
consecutive weeks) (ANAO 2017). Where participants work for 26 or 
more weeks, their employers are also eligible for Employer Incentive 
Funding – a one-off payment made directly to the employer who keeps 
the participant in work (ANAO 2017).  
Although CDP was introduced on the basis that it would deliver ‘stronger 
economic and social outcomes in remote Australia’ (Department of Jobs 
and Small Business 2018), it involved a reduction in funding for broader 
economic development. For example, the Community Development 
Fund that existed under RJCP was worth $47.5 million per year. This was 
replaced under CDP with the Indigenous Enterprise Development Fund, 
worth $25 million per year (ANAO 2017).  
Existing evidence and debate concerning CDP 
Since it began operating, CDP has been the subject of ongoing and 
widespread debate. Although the Australian Government has continued 
to assert the apparent benefits of CDP, others have identified flaws with 
the programme.  
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Outcomes under CDP 
The Commonwealth Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Nigel Scullion 
(2017) has claimed that CDP has been a ‘success’ in terms of its ability to 
deliver ‘jobs and support for remote jobseekers.’ A representative of 
PMC (Williams in Commonwealth Hansard 2016: 82) reported in a 
senate estimates hearing that there had been a higher proportion of 
participants placed in and attending activities under CDP than under 
RJCP. However, it is unclear whether increased participation resulted in 
either improved work readiness or transitions into employment. Further, 
Fowkes (2016b: 15) argued that these figures were probably 
administrative artefacts.  
In terms of job-placement outcomes, PMC (2018b) reported that, 
between the inception of CDP until 30 September 2017, the programme 
had resulted in 15,062 participants being placed into 19,748 jobs; 14,316 
(72%) of these placements were for 10,960 Indigenous participants. Most 
(73%) of the total placements were in casual employment, with the 
remaining 12% in part-time and 14% in full-time positions. However, 
there is no further qualitative evidence available regarding the nature of 
these placements (e.g. whether the placements aligned with participants’ 
skillsets, were suitable to their needs and circumstances, and/or whether 
they provided opportunity for sufficient income). These have been 
recognised as problems in past programmes (Stromback 2008). 
Over the same time period, 44% of the total Indigenous job placements 
resulted in at least a 13-week outcome, while 29% resulted in 26-week 
outcomes. There is no indication in the available reports of longer-term 
outcomes for these participants. It is also unclear what level of 
disadvantage was experienced by participants who achieved these results, 
which may be an indication of whether CDP is able to support both the 
least and most disadvantaged.  
It is difficult to determine whether these results are better or worse than 
those achieved under RJCP and other previous programmes, because 
comparable data are not available (e.g. ANAO 2017: 26). An evaluation 
of the JN was able to demonstrate (with some methodological 
limitations) that participants placed in certain programme phases were 
more likely than those not in the programme to move into employment 
(DEEWR 2008), but the available data reported against both RJCP and 
CDP do not consider counterfactuals.     
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Despite Government reports of successful outcomes under CDP, there is 
yet to be any rigorous evaluative evidence provided. Although an 
independent evaluation of CDP is ongoing (SSCFPA 2017: 18), and was 
due for completion in mid-2018, it has not yet been released. Meanwhile, 
assessments of the programme in the broader literature represent a stark 
contrast to the Australian Government’s complimentary rhetoric.  
Accounts of CDP in the literature 
A key criticism of CDP has been the perceived unfairness of its dramatic 
increase in Work for the Dole obligations, which outstrip those under 
previous programmes, as well as in comparable urban schemes (Altman 
2016; Fowkes 2016a). The fact that CDP participants have to undertake 
up to 25 hours per week of activities means their average hourly income 
is below the Australian award rate (Jordan 2016). These heavy 
requirements also leave little time available to pursue enterprising 
opportunities beyond CDP (Altman 2016; Altman and Klein 2018).    
This increase in participation requirements is also likely one of the 
causes of the dramatic increase in penalties applied under CDP. Fowkes 
(2016a: 16) reported that, since CDP began, the number of penalties 
applied under the scheme has exceeded those applied in comparable 
urban schemes like Jobactive ‘even though Jobactive has more than 20 
times the number of participants.’ In its first year of operation, more than 
125,000 NSNP penalties had been enforced under CDP (Fowkes 2016a: 
16). This trend continued into 2017 (Department of Employment 2017). 
The ANAO (2017) reported that the penalties applied per year under 
CDP exceed those applied under RJCP. However, there is no evidence 
that this higher application of penalties has resulted in any improved 
outcomes for participants (Fowkes 2016a). In fact, many have argued 
that outcomes have worsened (e.g. Jordan 2016; Kral 2016).  
There have been reports of participants being subject to situations of 
extreme poverty as a result of experiencing non-payment periods under 
CDP. Kral (2016) reported that, in the Ngaanyatjarra communities in 
Western Australia, participants often go without food and cannot afford 
housing payments when income is stopped under the CDP compliance 
framework. An inability to pay fines can also result in a higher risk of 
later imprisonment, which Kral (2016: 22) argued effectively 
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criminalises poverty. Where food is scarce, some participants may also 
turn to theft.    
In relation to the Aṉangu people of the APY Lands, Jordan (2016: 144–
145) stated that service providers have suggested that, although penalties 
applied under CDP:  
might encourage some Aṉangu to engage more fully…, more likely 
outcomes include further alienation of those with the greatest barriers to 
steady employment, an intensification of existing patterns in which 
Aṉangu rely on kinship networks for material needs, and escalating 
resentment, intra-community violence, poverty and theft.  
Remote-living Indigenous Australians experience multifaceted and 
extreme disadvantage at higher rates than other Australians (PMC 2018a; 
Productivity Commission 2016). CDP participants are, therefore, more 
likely to be experiencing complex employment barriers. Under the 
previous JN program, for example, around 90% of Indigenous 
participants were eligible for Intensive Assistance, which was designed 
for the most severely disadvantaged participants (DEEWR 2002: 115). 
Involvement with the criminal justice system, both in the cases of 
defaulting on fines or committing theft for survival (as described above), 
may then create additional barriers to employment. 
The service provider payment structure under CDP has also been 
criticised for its potential to create perverse incentives for providers to 
disregard the circumstances of severely disadvantaged participants 
(ANAO 2017; Fowkes 2016b: 14; Staines 2018). Others have criticised 
CDP because of its failure to take into account the low availability of 
employment in most remote Australian communities. Simultaneously, 
government-led efforts to bolster remote economies have too often 
produced negligible outcomes (though there are exceptions to this rule).6 
For instance, the Indigenous Procurement Policy and Indigenous 
Business Australia have had mixed success (e.g. Jacobs 2017; Piesse 
                                                 
6 There have also been some broader efforts that have proven more successful, such as the 
Working on Country Indigenous ranger programmes, which are typically delivered by 
Indigenous organisations with Commonwealth funding. These programmes have reportedly 
improved opportunities for economic engagement and employment, while also providing 
other social benefits (Urbis Pty Ltd 2012; WalterTurnbull 2010).There are also Indigenous-
led and private-sector initiatives that have created further remote employment opportunities 
(e.g. Centre for Appropriate Technology 2014; Cape York Enterprises 2015; Rio Tinto 
n.d.).    
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2016). Further, Jobs Australia (2015: 21) reported that minimal funding 
had been received under the CDP Enterprise Development Fund and that 
the creation of job opportunities were not, on the whole, being supported.  
Overall, the literature is overwhelmingly critical, and highlights a 
number of areas where CDP has had negative impacts for participants 
and service providers alike. Although the existing literature draws 
lessons from administrative data (Fowkes 2016a), the experiences of 
particular communities (Altman 2016; Jordan 2016), service providers 
(Fowkes 2016b) and some partial accounts of individual participants 
(Kral 2016; Paterson 2016), there are no studies that present case-study 
research to illuminate how individuals in different circumstances are 
affected by CDP. This study fills this gap and contributes to the existing 
literature by drawing on case studies of 24 CDP participants across two 
remote regions. These cases offer further empirical grounding for some 
of the assessments of CDP in the existing literature, and also suggest 
some potential lessons for future policy and programme design.   
Methodology 
This paper draws on two sets of case studies of CDP participants from 
remote regions in FNQ and the Top End of the NT (see Table 1). The first 
set of case studies (n=13) was developed by the author in partnership 
with a CDP provider in a remote area of FNQ. The provider randomly 
selected 13 participants from their caseload, using a random-number 
generator. The case studies were developed by triangulating case 
managers’ own knowledge about the participants with data contained in 
their administrative files.   
The second set of case studies (n=11) was developed by the North 
Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency (NAAJA) and published in its 
submission to the 2017 Australian senate inquiry into ‘the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of the objectives, design, 
implementation and evaluation’ of CDP (NAAJA 2017). These cases 
were included in order to provide a second perspective from a different 
region. Although other submissions to the senate inquiry also contained 
partial and some full case studies (e.g. NPY Lands Empowered 
Communities 2017), the NAAJA cases were the most comprehensive. 
NAAJA (2017) developed the case studies based on feedback from CDP 
participants who are also clients of NAAJA.  
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Table 1. Summary of case study details (N=24) 
Location Case study no. Participant characteristics 
Male/Female Age 
FNQ 1A Female 20 
1B Male 38 
1C Male 53 
1D Male 50 
1E Female 24 
1F Male 52 
1G Female 29 
1H Male 37 
1I Male 50 
1J Female 50 
1K Male 55 
1L Male 23 
1M Male 49 
Top End NT 2A Male 22 
2B Male 48 
2C Female 49 
2D Female  48 
2E Female 37 
2F Female 39 
2G Male 22 
2H Female 42 
2I Male 44 
2J Male 39 
2K Female 26 
Source: Compiled by the author from CDP administrative files (FNQ) and 
NAAJA 2017 (NT). 
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The specific regions in which these participants reside, as well as the 
names of the service providers that deliver CDP to them, have not been 
identified here to ensure the participants’ anonymity is protected. Both 
sets of case studies were thematically coded, using a grounded-theory 
approach. This enabled the data to ‘speak for itself’ and core themes to 
emerge inductively.  
Limitations 
Neither set of case studies is intended to be representative of the 
experiences of all CDP participants in these locations, or elsewhere. The 
different sources of the two sets of case studies likely influences their 
foci and the information they contain. The NAAJA cases are based on 
first-hand accounts from its clients who are also aggrieved CDP 
participants. The clients had been engaged by NAAJA’s civil lawyers and 
the cases were subsequently selected for inclusion in its 2017 submission 
to the senate inquiry into CDP – that is, for the express purpose of 
advocacy (NAAJA 2017: 5). Because the clients were engaged by 
NAAJA to potentially pursue civil action, and also because the cases 
were selected and published as a means of advocacy to the senate 
inquiry, there is likely a degree of sampling bias, which produces a less 
favourable representation of participant experiences under CDP. 
The FNQ cases were randomly sampled. However, they were developed 
predominantly based on second-hand information about CDP 
participants, which was contained in their administrative files, case notes 
and case managers’ own accounts. Thus, they are based on information 
that has been gathered primarily for the purpose of service delivery. 
Although these included some first-hand descriptions from CDP 
participants (e.g. when these were captured verbatim in case notes), 
future research should consider directly engaging participants to relay 
their stories and experiences first hand. Because the FNQ cases are based 
on provider accounts, they are less likely to include critical views of 
provider actions, and are less useful for understanding what participants 
think are the best or worst aspects of CDP. Alternatively, they are very 
useful in highlighting the day-to-day functioning of CDP and challenges 
that arise for providers in managing and delivering the programme.  
The two sets of cases are dissimilar in terms of their scope and 
perspectives. However, there is nevertheless sufficient consistency in the 
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issues that arise from them to generate useful analysis of how CDP 
affects individual participants. These core issues are discussed separately 
below. 
Results and discussion 
Of the total 24 CDP participants in this study, 14 (58%) were male and 
10 (42%) were female. The average age of the participants was 39.4 
years (min=20, max=55) and all were Indigenous, aside from case 2D, 
whose Indigenous/non-Indigenous status was unclear. The following 
sections describe and discuss common themes that arose from the case 
studies.  
Balancing family, culture and programme participation 
The CDP participants in this study often had diverse responsibilities to 
family and kin, for example as carers for children and grandchildren 
(case studies 1E, 2A, 2B, 2C, 2G) and ill spouses and kin (e.g. case 
studies 1H, 2B, 2C, 2E). Two participants (case studies 2B and 2C) were 
full-time carers for two children, and had other family and grandchildren 
living with them. They also provided ongoing care for one of their 
daughters and a cousin sister, who both had significant medical 
conditions.   
Another participant (case study 2E) was a primary carer for her husband, 
who was disabled in a car accident, as well as her mother-in-law who 
was also disabled and living with the participant, her four children and 
two grandchildren. The participant had to balance these caring 
responsibilities against their CDP activity obligations; often the balance 
was difficult to achieve. As a result, they had been subject to multiple 
NSNP penalties and a serious penalty period of eight weeks. She was 
ultimately able to have her family obligations recognised as ‘home care’ 
activities for CDP, but this has not been the case for other participants 
(e.g. 1G, 1H) for reasons that are unclear. 
Some participants also had cultural obligations, which had to be balanced 
against CDP participation. For example, one participant (2A) could not 
complete his CDP activities when he was required to undertake a six-
month-long men’s initiation ceremony – a significant cultural 
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responsibility. The ceremony required the participant to spend time at a 
remote outstation where he was unable to take a phone or to leave: both 
actions would have meant breaking lore. Because he was unable to 
contact his provider or Centrelink, his payments stopped for the period 
while he was away and were not reinstated for more than a year (as 
described later, he had made attempts to advise Centrelink before he left, 
but these were unsuccessful).  
Difficulty in balancing cultural, family and employment obligations have 
also been noted by others in the broader literature (e.g. Jordan 2017; 
Karmel et al. 2014; Ngurratjuta Pmara Ntjarra Aboriginal Corporation 
2017; Pearson and Daff 2010; SSCFPA 2017). For example, in relation to 
mutual obligations more broadly, Pearson and Daff (2010: 32) argued 
that ‘long rosters and working hours… lead to absences from family and 
prevent the maintenance of kinship relations.’ The case studies indicate 
that the limited flexibility built into CDP means that participants are 
sometimes essentially punished for fulfilling their family and cultural 
obligations (Carmody in SSCFPA 2017: 38). The recognition of family 
responsibilities as ‘home care’ activities under CDP in one case study 
(2E) is promising, but the thresholds for this decision are unclear and 
there are no other examples in the cases where this exception has been 
made, despite similar circumstances.  
Health issues 
Many of the participants in this study experience complex health needs 
(e.g. case studies 1A, 1B, 1D, 1K, 2D, 2H, 2I). In some instances, this 
affects their ability to fulfil their CDP activity obligations, but 
exemptions are not always provided. One participant (case study 2H) has 
diabetes, back and kidney problems, fluid around her heart, and high 
blood pressure. She reported that she had attempted to tell her provider 
that this affected her ability to participate in CDP activities, but that her 
payments were nevertheless suspended when she was unable to 
participate. In 2017, her payments were cut off for eight weeks because 
of a failure to participate.   
Another participant (case study 2C) had been in a car accident three 
years earlier and had ongoing health concerns. She was required to 
participate in a sewing programme under CDP, which caused 
considerable pain to her back and neck. She subsequently chose not to 
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attend some activities, which led to her payments being temporarily 
suspended. She told her provider about her health condition, but ‘no 
exemption was actioned by them’ (NAAJA 2017: 12).  
In another case (1D), a participant who had suffered a significant heart 
attack alerted his provider, who applied to have his participation 
requirements reassessed. However, the provider described Centrelink’s 
reassessment process as being ‘extremely difficult’ and, ultimately, the 
individual was not reassessed until nine months after his heart attack. In 
the interim, the participant had to regularly contact Centrelink to 
repeatedly explain his medical condition so that he could be exempted 
from activities and avoid penalties.    
There are other similar examples in the case studies where participants 
have been placed in activities that are unsuitable and exacerbate existing 
health conditions (e.g. case studies 2B and 2I). Three of the 24 cases (1A, 
1B and 1K) also included participants who experienced serious mental 
health issues. The 20-year-old female participant in case study 1A had 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia. She has a strong family history of 
the illness, and had been hospitalised multiple times over the previous 
two years due to severe psychotic episodes. These involved her hearing 
voices and making threats of self-harm. The participant receives regular 
anti-psychotic injections administered by a local mental health nurse, but 
continues to have ongoing mood disturbances and auditory 
hallucinations. Despite her condition, which has been well documented, a 
recent Centrelink assessment stated that ‘The client’s personal factors 
have low impact on their ability to work, obtain work or look for work.’ 
She has been formally assessed by Centrelink as being capable of 
undertaking eight to fourteen hours of ‘light, less-skilled’ activities per 
week. Her CDP service provider reported that this is unrealistic because 
of the severity of the participants’ health needs, but they have little 
choice but to continue to try and engage her. Ironically, the participant 
has also been rated by Centrelink as being ‘high risk’ for noncompliance, 
in which case she is also high risk of experiencing non-payment periods. 
Arguably, Centrelink’s assessment that the participnt represents a high 
noncompliance risk is at least a partial admission that she is not a suitable 
candidate for CDP because the compliance assessment is presumably 
based on the severity of her schizophrenia.  
Another participant (case study 1B) – a 38-year-old male – was also 
diagnosed with schizophrenia (alongside other barriers, including chronic 
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substance abuse). He has ongoing sleep disturbances, thought 
disturbances, poor self-care and anger-management issues. He also 
participated in Stream C under a previous programme (also formerly 
known as Stream 4, which was reserved for participants experiencing 
extreme barriers to employment). However, despite his circumstances, he 
was assessed by Centrelink as being able to look for work and participate 
in CDP for 15–22 hours per week, with a view to transitioning to 23–29 
hours per week within two years. The service provider commented that 
this was unreasonable, given the participant’s ongoing health and drug-
dependency issues. Ultimately, the provider feels that the individual 
should be receiving intensive health-care support, rather than 
participating in an employment programme.            
In at least some cases (e.g. 2B, 2I) a lack of locally-available medical 
personnel, or difficulty engaging with available healthcare services also 
made it difficult to obtain medical documentation needed to account for 
missed activities. In one case (1K), the service provider strongly 
suspected a participant was experiencing undiagnosed mental health 
issues. However, despite repeatedly referring the individual to a local 
clinic, they did not attend and thus, their participation requirements have 
not been able to be reassessed. The participant has subsequently 
experienced regular non-payment periods, and the provider commented 
that this may serve to further undermine their health. 
Ultimately, an inability to access adequate healthcare – either because of 
barriers to engagement, or a lack of availability – appears to be a key 
issue for at least some of the participants in this study. This aligns with 
reports elsewhere about lack of health services, including mental health 
services, for remote participants (SSCFPA 2017: 35–36). In at least some 
cases it appears to further increase the risk of NSNP penalties being 
applied. For individuals already experiencing significant health issues, 
reductions in their income (and in some cases removal of income for 
extended periods) is likely to further compound their disadvantage. 
In some of the cases described here there is also an apparent incongruity 
between Centrelink assessments of participant capabilities and local 
knowledge about their needs – an issue also raised in the senate inquiry 
(SSCFPA 2017: 52–53). This indicates a need to reconsider assessment 
protocols, including whether decisions are based on sufficient 
information and local knowledge, and whether they are made in 
participants’ best interests. It also supports other findings, such as those 
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by the Commonwealth Ombudsman (2016) concerning the difficulties 
faced by remote-living Indigenous Australians in accessing the Disability 
Support Pension (DSP). It is likely that at least some individuals 
participating in CDP, including some described in this study, would be 
more suited to and better served by DSP.    
Hardships as a result of suspended payments 
Many of the participants in these case studies had spent periods of time 
not receiving an income due to an inability to comply with CDP 
programme requirements (e.g. case studies 1D, 1G, 1J, 2A, 2B, 2G). One 
participant (2A) had no income for more than a year. The participant in 
case study 2E reported consistently struggling with money to purchase 
food to feed her large family who were dependent on her. She was having 
money taken out of her payments to service loans but had also had two 
NSNP penalties and an eight-week non-payment penalty imposed. 
Another participant (case study 2G), who was a primary carer for his 
two-year-old son, had struggled to pay for food after two weeks without 
payments. He was particularly concerned about finding money to feed 
his son, highlighting the flow-on effects that non-payment periods can 
have for other vulnerable family members.      
These findings are consistent with those reported elsewhere about the 
severity of the CDP compliance framework and the widespread 
application of NSNP and serious penalty periods (Fowkes 2016c; Kral 
2016; SSCFPA 2017: 43). Wycherley et al. (2017) demonstrated that 
even short-term fluctuations in an income cycle can reduce the nutrient 
value of the diets of remote-living Indigenous Australians, which can 
exacerbate lifestyle-related disease risks. This indicates that the impacts 
of CDP on income availability, and the potential flow-on impacts for 
health and wellbeing, need to be more carefully considered under future 
programmes – particularly if employment policies are meant to 
complement other strategies designed to ‘close the gap’ in health and 
wellbeing for Indigenous Australians.     
Interactions with the criminal justice system 
Indigenous Australians continue to be more likely than other Australians 
to have involvement with the criminal justice system, both as victims and 
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offenders (ALRC 2017). Of the 24 cases in this study, six (25%) had at 
least some record of contact with the criminal justice system (case 
studies 1C, 1E, 1J, 1L, 1M, 2A) – five as perpetrators (for various 
offences including trespass and stealing) and one as a victim of violent 
crime.  
One participant (case study 1E) is a young woman who was described by 
her service provider as having ‘much potential’ and a ‘strong’ desire to 
work. However, she is a victim of severe domestic violence which has 
significantly hindered her ability to participate in CDP and move into 
employment. She had transitioned into three jobs in the previous year but 
could not sustain them because she needed to regularly take time off to 
recover from often severe domestic-violence-related injuries. Recently, 
the participant’s partner was convicted and is now serving an extended 
period of gaol time for the violence committed against her. Since her 
partner was incarcerated the participant has commenced a traineeship and 
is excelling – she is now looking to move back into employment. In this 
case CDP has helped the participant but only after another significant 
barrier was removed.     
In other cases, there is some evidence that CDP may create an 
environment that contributes to increased potential for criminality, 
especially where payments are suspended for periods of time. In case 
study 2A, the participant had contact with the criminal justice system 
after being cut off from Centrelink payments for more than a year. He 
was charged with stealing and trespass: NAAJA (2017) indicated that the 
participant’s actions were likely motivated by the poverty he experienced 
from having no income. This is similar to accounts reported elsewhere 
(Jordan 2016; Kral 2016; SSCFPA 2017: 55–56). The participant pleaded 
guilty and was given a suspended sentence, as well as a substantial fine. 
However, he cannot set up a payment plan for his fine because he is still 
not receiving Centrelink payments. He told NAAJA (2017: 8) that ‘he 
does not know how he will pay the fine.’ Across Australia, defaulting on 
fines is a key gateway for entrance into the criminal justice system, 
especially for Indigenous Australians (Methven 2018; Western Australian 
Ombudsman 2017). This is a potential outcome if this participant fails to 
pay his fine, which supports Kral’s (2016: 22) previous contention that 
the conditions created under CDP can, in some cases, effectively 
criminalise poverty.   
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In two other cases (1J, 1M) participants supplemented their income 
through the sale of prohibited items (illicit drugs and alcohol) and, thus, 
were less affected by non-payment periods which they experienced 
regularly. The first participant (1J) is facing charges while the second 
(1M) is incarcerated. Whether or not these participants had done the 
same under previous programmes, or would do so under different 
circumstances, is unclear. In further cases examined in this study, there 
are also other factors that play a clear role in heightening propensity for 
participants’ involvement in the criminal justice system. These include 
family dynamics and parental criminality (e.g. case study 1L).  
Even though the disadvantage experienced by many remote-living 
Indigenous Australians goes beyond mere ‘income poverty’ (Hunter 
2001) it is also possible that, by exacerbating poverty through extended 
non-payment periods, CDP may help to create an anomic environment 
where general strain may contribute to propensity for crime for some 
participants (Agnew 1992). Further research is needed in this regard, 
especially to tease out the complex factors that contribute to these (and 
potentially other) participants’ criminality. However, the potential 
influence of employment policy on crime should be at least a partial 
consideration for future policymaking.        
Engaging with Centrelink 
Many participants experience barriers to engaging with CDP providers 
and Centrelink (e.g. case studies 1D, 2A, 2B). One participant (case 
study 2A) had attempted to contact Centrelink before attending a cultural 
ceremony, but ‘could not get onto them beforehand and found it hard to 
explain because ceremony is a secret business so hard to talk about with 
strangers.’ Low English language literacy also plays a role in making it 
difficult for some participants to engage with Centrelink (e.g. case 
studies 1D, 2B, 2J). One participant (2I), who speaks English as a second 
language, reported that it was difficult to talk to Centrelink officers over 
the phone because they ‘speak fast’ and ‘ask a lot of questions.’ Another 
participant (2J) reported that Centrelink staff spoke to him in a ‘fancy 
way’ that he could not properly understand.  
The participant in case study 2B spoke English as a second language and 
demonstrated signs of gratuitous concurrence (Lauchs 2010) but, as 
NAAJA (2017: 8) indicated, ‘This can be subtle, and would be extremely 
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difficult for persons with little experience of dealing with Aboriginal 
people to detect over a telephone conversation.’ The participant requested 
that Centrelink provide an interpreter, but none was subsequently 
provided. Ironically, the participant’s wife (case studies 2B, 2C) gave up 
her own employment in order to help her husband re-instate his 
Centrelink payments by acting as his interpreter.  
Participants reported feeling frustrated, powerless and ashamed at not 
being able to communicate clearly with Centrelink, nor understand what 
was required of them in terms of programme participation (case studies 
2B, 2E, 2F, 2J). Inadequate access to information about CDP, including 
access to interpreters where appropriate, is a significant issue. If 
participants do not understand the rules there is little hope of their being 
able to follow them to maintain their income. In some cases participants 
responded by withdrawing entirely (e.g. case study 2B). The 2017 senate 
inquiry into CDP (SSCFPA 2017: 107) recommended that the 
Department of Human Services invests in employing local Indigenous 
interpreters in remote communities to support Indigenous CDP 
participants. This may represent a positive step and also provide further 
employment opportunities, however, it is unclear whether this will form 
part of the revised programme due for implementation in 2019.   
In addition to language and cultural barriers, CDP participants also 
experience frustration at trying to contact Centrelink over the phone 
because of long wait times. One participant (2F) tried to call Centrelink 
to have her payments reinstated and ended up spending eight to nine 
hours on the phone. NAAJA (2017: 14) reported that this participant’s 
experience was objectively confirmed by CDP provider staff because she 
used the CDP provider’s phone. Other participants also experienced 
frustration at long waiting times (e.g. case studies 1D, 2B, 2G, 2I).  
These accounts align with other reports about Centrelink waiting times, 
which have worsened under CDP (ANAO 2017: 47; Conifer 2017; 
Tjuwanpa Outstation Resource Centre Aboriginal Corporation 2017). 
Despite this, the ANAO (2017) reported that average call times for 
Centrelink from remote areas were lower than in urban areas. It reported 
the maximum call wait time in remote areas as 2 hours and 44 minutes – 
less than some of the wait times reported in the case studies in this 
article. It is possible that this could be related to differences in counting 
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methods.7 Nevertheless, inaccessibility appears to be a key issue under 
CDP and is exacerbated by language barriers.    
Transitions into employment 
Altman (2016) argued that intensive Work for the Dole requirements, 
such as those experienced under CDP, can reduce potential to pursue 
enterprising opportunities that may lead to partial or full self-
employment over time. This was reflected in one of the case studies 
considered for this research, where a male participant (case study 1F) 
was also a well-known and respected artist who had been able to sell his 
art in the past to generate a partial income. Because his art-based income 
is sporadic, he also receives welfare income and participates in CDP.  
Initially, intensive CDP participation left little time for him to pursue his 
art and, thus, reduced his ability to generate his own income. After 
speaking with the participant about his ambitions, the CDP service 
provider placed him into activities8 at a local art centre, which has 
allowed him to continue creating and selling his art. In this instance, the 
participant has benefited from being able to align his activities with his 
business goals, but this is only because the provider demonstrated 
flexibility in placing him and could find a placement that was suitable. In 
other cases participants may not be as fortunate. Thus, the possible 
impact of intensive Work for the Dole requirements on undermining 
enterprise should be carefully considered.    
Only one of the participants considered in this research (case study 1I) 
was, at the time this research was undertaken, employed as a result of 
CDP. This participant had fewer identified barriers to employment and 
had also previously been employed. After participating in CDP he began 
working as a part-time cleaner for a local business. The CDP provider 
reports that he has indicated that he is ‘happy’ with the work. Although 
                                                 
7 For instance, the average call wait time reported by the ANAO represented the average 
time a caller spends in a queue after going through the automated answer service, but it is 
unclear whether callers could wait in multiple queues during the same call. It is also 
possible that the participants in the case studies were calling repeatedly, rather than waiting 
on hold. 
8 Under CDP, activities can be delivered by the service provider or by ‘host organisations’ 
such as businesses or not-for-profits. The activity in this instance was delivered by a host 
organisation through a hosted-placement arrangement.   
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the outcome for this participant has been positive, his story provides a 
counter-narrative to the significant challenges involved in supporting 
participants in the remaining case studies, many of whom experience 
multiple and complex barriers, into paid work.  
Conclusion  
CDP operates on the basis that increasing downward pressure on 
participants in the form of harsher penalties and stricter requirements will 
‘push’ them into employment. However, as Jordan and Altman (2016: 
10) stated: 
if one acknowledges the major structural barriers to employment 
opportunity, it is difficult to accept that withholding welfare payments 
unless recipients display the ‘correct’ behaviours (judged according to 
mainstream Australian norms) will be sufficient to lead to a job.  
Firstly, there are generally few employment opportunities available in 
remote communities (SSCFPA 2017). Secondly, CDP does little to 
address other individual-level barriers to employment, including 
multifaceted circumstances of disadvantage experienced by many 
participants.  
Unemployment can be a by-product of complex circumstances of 
disadvantage such as those described in this study. Withholding payments 
does not alleviate these circumstances. The only logical outcome is that, 
by reducing income, disadvantage is further entrenched. Although the 
overarching goal of CDP is apparently to move participants into paid 
work over time, the experiences of many of the individuals described in 
this study indicate that, ironically, it can have the result of establishing 
further barriers to employment. It may also reduce incentives and 
opportunity for some participants to pursue their own enterprise. This 
indicates that there are inherent flaws in the design of CDP. Although 
there are undoubtedly a minority of participants who benefit from the 
programme, this research suggests that it is more likely to be those who 
are experiencing fewer barriers. The FNQ provider in this study 
described CDP as a ‘one size fits all’ programme. This inflexible 
approach does not appear to provide similar positive benefits to those 
experiencing complex disadvantage.   
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Indigenous organisations have proposed alternatives to CDP that should 
be given thorough consideration (e.g. APO NT 2017). However, early 
indications of what the revised programme, set to replace CDP in early 
2019, might look like do not instil hope of significant change and do not 
align with these alternative proposals (PMC 2017b). In keeping with the 
severe incrementalism that has characterised remote employment policies 
since 2007 (Staines 2018), it is unlikely that the new programme will 
incorporate the kinds of policy shifts necessary to alleviate entrenched 
disadvantage and improve longer-term outcomes. However, significant 
change is needed if any traction is to be gained in improving remote 
employment while simultaneously reducing (rather than worsening) other 
symptoms of disadvantage. 
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